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361 
FREE SPEECH AND POLITICAL 
LEGITIMACY: A RESPONSE TO ED BAKER 
James Weinstein* 
Normative discussion too often suffers from lack of 
agreement on criteria by which to judge the merits of the various 
contending theories. Bereft of such common ground normative 
debate often has the deep subjectivity—and hence the 
productivity—of schoolyard boasts about whose dog is best. I 
was therefore delighted to discover that the normative essence 
of the autonomy-based theory of free speech that Ed Baker 
proposes in this Symposium is political legitimacy,1 the same 
basic norm underlying the somewhat different visions of 
participatory democracy that Robert Post and I defend in a 
related symposium as the best explanation of the American free 
speech principle.2 Having identified this common ground, I will 
in Part I of this response attempt to show that there is a firmer 
connection between legitimacy and participatory democracy 
than there is between legitimacy and the autonomy theory that 
Ed proposes. Part II responds to certain of Ed’s claims about the 
fit between his theory and current free speech doctrine. Part III 
concludes this response with a short discussion of why overall 
doctrinal fit matters in determining the best theory of the First 
Amendment. 
I. LEGITIMACY 
A. DEFINITION 
As Ed notes, political legitimacy is at least a partial solution 
to the age-old problem of justifying the “use of otherwise 
 
 *  Amelia D. Lewis Professor of Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law, Arizona State University. 
 1. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251 (2011).  
 2. See Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 
477 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011).  
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immoral force or coercion to enforce the law”;3 or, relatedly, and 
adopting H.L.A. Hart’s famous distinction, a partial answer to 
the question of what conditions are necessary to “obligate, not 
merely oblige people” to obey the law.4 But though Ed, Robert, 
and I all ground our theories in political legitimacy, none of us so 
far in this discussion has explained precisely or in any detail what 
we mean by that term. So I will suggest that the term 
“legitimacy” in this context has both a descriptive and a 
normative sense: descriptively, a legal system is invested with 
legitimacy to the extent that citizens obey the laws not just out of 
fear of punishment but also out of a sense of duty (or 
“obligation,” to use Hart’s term); or if not out of something as 
strong as duty, at least because they think that obeying the law is 
generally the right thing to do. Normatively, a legal system is 
legitimate if it warrants, on moral grounds, the allegiance of its 
citizens.5 
Ed’s use of the term in his article for this Symposium 
suggests that he is concerned predominately, if not exclusively, 
with the normative sense of the term, which may mean that our 
mutual reliance on legitimacy provides common ground only 
with respect to the normative but not the descriptive sense.6 It 
seems to me, however, that these two senses of legitimacy 
converge at least at the following point: one reason that citizens 
might feel obligated rather than merely obliged to obey the laws, 
or at least might believe that obeying the laws is generally the 
right thing to do, is their warranted conviction that the legal 
system is, on the whole, moral. For this reason, I will consider 
both senses of the term in the discussion that follows. However, 
in an attempt to find common ground on which to engage Ed, I 
will emphasize the normative dimension. 
B. LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY 
Although ultimately basing his theory in autonomy, it is 
significant that Ed recognizes that “[d]emocracy is one answer” 
 
 3. Baker, supra note 1, at 262; see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82–
91 (2d ed. 1994). 
 4. Baker, supra note 1, at 262; see also Hart, supra note 3. 
 5. This particular phrasing of the normative sense of legitimacy was suggested to 
me by my colleague Jeffrie Murphy. See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Allegiance and 
Lawful Government, 79 ETHICS 56 (1968).  
 6. There is a third, exclusively positivistic conception of legal legitimacy that 
focuses on whether government assumed power in accordance with the system’s rule of 
recognition for the transfer of power and, while in power, acts in general accord with the 
constitutional rules that define the scope of the powers given to it under the constitution.  
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to the question of what can make a legal order legitimate. 
Indeed, he even allows that because at least in a formal sense 
a democratic process . . . ‘equally’ respects people as properly 
having a ‘say’ in the rules they live under. . . . [D]emocracy is 
arguably the best that can be done, given the impossibility (or, 
at least, lack of pragmatic appeal) of anarchic or completely 
voluntaristic social life, for justifying the legitimacy of the 
social order.7 
Given this paean to democracy’s legitimating power, why then 
doesn’t Ed agree with Robert and me that it is that speech by 
which people “hav[e] a ‘say’ in the rules they live under” that is 
the primary concern of the First Amendment? He offers three 
interrelated reasons for declining to do so: 1) the proper 
conception of democracy needs specification in terms of a moral 
rather than just a sociological or historical basis; 2) “[t]he 
obvious value premise that requires that democracy take a form 
that protects people’s political speech is a principle that requires 
respect for citizen’s autonomy within the law making process—
that views them as agents with proper claims to self-
determination as well as having their interest in self-realization;” 
and 3) there is “no obvious reason to limit this respect for self-
government to collective self-governing—the political sphere—
as opposed to self-governing also within private spheres.”8 
I readily agree that the conception of democracy that 
connects free speech and legitimacy needs “specification” in 
moral terms. As I will explain in more detail below, the specific 
moral basis for the conception of democracy that I believe 
underlies the American free speech principle—popular 
sovereignty and the individual right of political participation—is 
a profound commitment to formal political equality. I also agree 
that this moral basis and the two precepts that it generates 
require respect for autonomy within the law making process. But 
here Ed and I finally arrive at a crucial point of disagreement: 
although it may not be “obvious,” there is in my view a very 
good reason for confining the respect for autonomy demanded 
by political equality, and the specific conception of democracy 
that it generates, to collective self-governance. 
As I have suggested in the related symposium,9 there are 
two separate presuppositions (and accompanying ascriptions) of 
 
 7. Baker, supra note 1, at 263 (emphasis added).  
 8. Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added). 
 9. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free 
!!WEINSTEIN-272-RESPONSETOBAKER3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:26 AM 
364 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:361 
 
autonomy. The first flows from the basic precept that in a 
democracy it is the people, both collectively and individually, not 
the government, who possess the ultimate sovereignty. This basic 
precept would be inverted if the government could restrict 
speech on the grounds that the ultimate governors, or some 
segment of them, were either too foolish or too dependent to be 
trusted to hear the expression of certain views or receive certain 
information on matters relevant to their governing authority. 
The second presupposition flows from the very reason we would 
care about legitimacy in the first place: that people are, as Ed 
notes, “agents with proper claims to self-determination . . . [and] 
interest[s] in self-realization.”10 It is this second, ubiquitous 
presupposition of autonomy that must be respected both within 
and outside of the political process. In contrast, since the first 
presupposition flows from a precept of popular sovereignty, it 
need be respected only when citizens are acting in their 
sovereign capacity. 
Crucially, these two presuppositions of autonomy differ not 
only in the contexts in which they arise but also with regard to 
the conditions that can legitimately justify their infringement. 
Reflecting the vital connection between popular sovereignty and 
political legitimacy, the autonomy presupposed of people 
engaged in democratic self-governance can properly be 
infringed, if at all, only in extraordinary circumstances.11 In 
contrast, as I shall discuss in detail below, in most cases no 
disrespect for the ubiquitous presupposition of autonomy arises 
if government has good reason for its infringement. 
Though he does not say why, Ed obviously does not agree 
with my view that the presupposition of autonomy relevant to 
collective self-governance differs from the more minimal 
presupposition of autonomy that must be ascribed to people in 
all other capacities. But having noted this crucial point of 
disagreement, I will now move on to what Ed calls his “more 
direct affirmative argument” for autonomy as the basis of a 
theory of free speech,12 which, as we shall see, will ultimately 
bring us back to the crucial point of disagreement. 
 
Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633 (2011). 
 10. Baker, supra note 1, at 265. 
 11. See Weinstein, supra note 2 at 498–99, 508–09. 
 12. Baker, supra note 1, at 267. 
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C. IN SEARCH OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FORMAL 
AUTONOMY AND LEGITIMACY 
According to Ed, “[t]he legitimacy of the legal order 
depends, in part, on it respecting the autonomy that it must 
attribute to the people whom it asks to obey its laws.”13 The 
autonomy that Ed is concerned with is formal autonomy,”a 
person’s authority (or right) to make decisions about herself—
her own meaningful actions and usually her use of her 
resources—as long as her actions do not block others’ similar 
authority or rights.”14 Although such autonomy obviously 
includes a lot more than speech, this sense of autonomy does, as 
Ed asserts, readily “encompass self-expressive rights that 
include, for example, a right to seek to persuade or unite or 
associate with others—or to offend, expose, condemn, or 
disassociate with them.”15 Although the connection between 
formal autonomy and speech may be apparent, the connection 
between respect for such autonomy and legitimacy is not. 
Specifically, I do not believe that Ed persuasively explains how 
the “legitimacy of the legal order” depends on government 
respecting formal autonomy. More crucially, he does not explain 
why restrictions justified by good and substantial reasons fail to 
respect this autonomy. 
Ed attempts to tie his view of autonomy to legitimacy as 
follows: After rejecting Kantian notions of consent or self-
authorship because they give those who dissent from a given law 
or an entire legal regime too much power over others, Ed 
concludes that: 
[T]he most that moral theory should expect of the majority, 
those prepared to back their law with force, is that they 
propose only laws or projects for which they can in good faith 
give reason to the dissenter for why she could and, the 
majority argues, should accept these laws.16 
This requirement “is an implicit premise of discourse, that is, of 
communicative action.”17 
 
 13. Id. at 251.  
 14. Id. at 254. Ed contrasts such formal autonomy with substantive autonomy, 
which he defines as a person’s “capacity to pursue successfully the life she endorses—
self-authored at least in the sense that, no matter how her image of a meaningful life 
originates, she now can endorse that life for reasons that she accepts.” Id. at 253.  
 15. Id. at 254.  
 16. Id. at 267. 
 17. Id. 
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1. The Overlapping Consensus Between Formal Autonomy 
and Participatory Democracy 
To the extent that the focus of Ed’s theory is with 
“discourse” or “communicative action” by which “the majority 
. . . in good faith give[s] reasons to the dissenter for why she 
could . . . accept . . . laws,” Ed’s theory, like Robert’s and my 
participatory democracy theories, focuses on the process 
necessary to make a particular law or the entire legal system 
legitimate. Moreover, just as our participatory democracy 
theories ascribe autonomy to those engaged in the project of 
democratic self-governance through public discourse, Ed’s 
requirement that dissenters be given reasons properly 
presupposes that these dissenters, as well as the majority with 
whom they are in dialogue, are autonomous agents. Ed notes the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus by which our differing 
theories protect public discourse.18 
Unlike a theory based in democratic participation, however, 
Ed’s theory also embraces communicative acts that have nothing 
to do with the process by which laws or social policy are 
adopted. Rather, as Ed makes clear the “communicative action” 
central to his theory concerns “a process by which people seek 
agreement” not just about public decisions through public 
discourse but also includes private discussion “such as ones in 
which a group of friends try to decide where to go to dinner.”19 
Consistent with this more expansive view, autonomy is ascribed 
to those engaged in the practice of seeking agreement on all 
matters whether public or private. The connection between 
respect for this broader conception of agreement-seeking 
communicative action and legitimacy is, however, obscure. And 
to the extent that his theory embraces communicative activity 
not part of the practice of seeking agreement, the connection 
with legitimacy through the autonomy presupposed for those 
involved in communicative action is completely severed.20 
 
 18. Id. at 269. 
 19. Id. at 267.  
 20. Ed’s concept of formal autonomy also embraces activity that is non-
communicative. However, for reasons of legal positivism, among others, Ed does not 
maintain that these activities are protected by the First Amendment. See Baker, supra 
note 1, at 256–57. 
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2. COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AS PART OF THE PRACTICE 
OF SEEKING AGREEMENT ON PRIVATE MATTERS 
Since the concept of seeking agreement with someone with 
no authority to reject a proposal or to ask for its modification 
would seem nonsensical, I concur with Ed that the 
communicative action by which people seek agreement on 
private as well as public matters presupposes that those engaged 
in this process are autonomous agents. In addition, I agree that 
government should respect the presupposition of autonomy 
inherent in this practice. I will even grant for the sake of 
argument that laws or regulations that fail to respect this 
autonomy are illegitimate and, further, that restrictions on 
autonomy imposed for insufficient reasons do not respect this 
autonomy. Crucially, however, at least for most exercises of 
formal autonomy, if government does have good and substantial 
reasons for restricting this autonomy, it does not act 
disrespectfully, and thus the regulation is not illegitimate, at least 
not on the ground that it disrespects people’s formal autonomy. 
A fortiori, substantially justified infringement of such autonomy 
does not undermine the legitimacy of the entire legal system. 
To adopt (and modify slightly) one of Ed’s examples: 
Suppose that Alice convinces Carol, Betty’s spouse, that Betty is 
worthless, and persuades Carol to leave Betty and live with her.21 
Suppose further that, based on this communicative action, Betty 
recovers a judgment against Alice for alienation of affection. 
Such a judgment would obviously infringe Alice’s formal 
autonomy. In addition, the imposition of legal liability for such 
conduct may be perfectly lousy social policy (not to mention at 
odds with the progressive domestic relations policy of a state 
that recognizes same-sex marriage). Therefore, most, though not 
all, states have abolished this cause of action.22 But it is not at all 
clear how alienation of affection laws are themselves 
illegitimate,23 let alone undermine the legitimacy of the entire 
legal system. 
 
 21. See id. at 254–55. 
 22. Seven states—Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South 
Dakota, and Utah—currently retain such laws. See Sheri Stritof & Bob Stritof, Alienation 
of Affection State Laws, ABOUT.COM, http://marriage.about.com/od/legalities/a/ 
alienation.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).  
 23. If the reasons offered by the state to justify the restriction were relatively weak 
as compared to the importance of the autonomy interests infringed, as may well be the 
case with respect to applications of alienation of affection laws such as hypothesized 
here, then this restriction would arguably fail to respect formal autonomy, thereby 
rendering it illegitimate. See note 30, infra. 
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Someone who has wooed away another’s spouse would no 
doubt resent being hit with a judgment for alienation of 
affection. With regard to the descriptive dimension of legitimacy, 
I doubt that for most people that the primary or even a 
significant reaction engendered by such judgment would be 
decreased allegiance to the state’s legal system. Similarly, from a 
normative perspective, such a judgment is not in my view the 
type of restriction that undermines the moral basis that warrants 
allegiance to the legal system. In contrast, if this same state 
passed a law that prohibited anyone from advocating abolition of 
this state’s alienation of affection law, I do think that allegiance 
to this state’s legal system would, and should, be diminished24 for 
those barred from expressing their views on this matter.25 
Indeed, the moral underpinnings warranting allegiance to the 
legal system might be diminished even for those who oppose or 
are undecided about abrogation of such suits but who are 
committed to fair and open debate on this and other public 
policy matters. 
Having not taken a poll on the issue, my assertion that, as a 
descriptive matter, a judgment for alienation of affection would 
undermine the legitimacy of the legal system, if at all, far less 
than a prohibition of advocacy a particular viewpoint on a 
 
 24. I use the word “diminish” advisedly. Thus a single viewpoint restriction on 
public discourse usually would not significantly undermine the legitimacy of the entire 
legal system but rather, to borrow Robert Dahl’s metaphor, would tend to reduce the 
level of the legitimacy “reservoir.” See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION 
AND OPPOSITION 148–49 (1971). In contrast, even an isolated viewpoint-discriminatory 
restriction on public debate can render illegitimate the application of a law to any person 
excluded from participating in the public discussion of that law. See Weinstein, supra 
note 2, at 498.  
 25. In accordance with the scope of our respective claims, the proper comparison 
here is between restrictions on formal autonomy without limitation, and viewpoint-based 
restrictions on public discourse, rather than all restrictions on public discourse. For while 
Ed claims that virtually all restrictions on such formal autonomy are illegitimate, I make 
no such claim with respect to all restrictions on public discourse generally. For one, in 
accord with current doctrine, my view is that content-neutral regulations are both 
constitutional and legitimate unless they impose a burden on citizens’ right to participate 
in public discourse that is both substantial and greatly disproportionate to the asserted 
state interest justifying the restriction. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 
(1989). And while for pragmatic reasons, I support the Court’s view that virtually all 
content-based restrictions on public discourse are unconstitutional, I do not believe that 
all such restrictions are always illegitimate. Rather, I agree with Justice O’Connor’s 
observation that the rule against content-based regulation of public discourse sometimes 
results in the invalidation of laws that “common sense may suggest . . . are entirely 
reasonable.” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
But I also agree with her that such a rule is nonetheless a good one “in an area where 
fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more subjective balancing 
tests.” Id.  
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matter of public concern, is, admittedly, based on little more 
than a hunch. I realize that this is a hunch that other reasonable 
observers, including some participants in this Symposium, might 
not share. Similarly, so far I have appealed primarily to intuition 
in asserting that, as a normative matter, alienation of affection 
judgments compromise, if they do it all, the moral basis 
warranting allegiance to the legal system far less than a provision 
prohibiting advocacy of abolition of such suits. Others, however, 
might not share this intuition. Since merely trading hunches and 
intuitions risks the “my dog is better than your dog” type of 
argument that I had hoped to avoid, I will now try to advance 
the inquiry by giving specific reasons why there is a more robust 
connection between participatory democracy and political 
legitimacy than there is between formal autonomy and such 
legitimacy. 
First, and most obviously, rules that constitute or directly 
affect the legal system, such as voting or election procedures, or 
limitations on the discussion through which public opinion is 
formed, will because of their systemic nature tend to have a 
greater bearing on the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole 
than will non-systemic rules such as those restricting most 
exercises of formal autonomy. Relatedly, so long as fair and 
open political processes exist, the possibility of repealing 
illegitimate laws not related to the political process remains 
open. Conversely, illegitimate restrictions on the political 
processes will make repeal of other types illegitimate laws much 
more difficult. 
More profoundly, measures that selectively restrict the 
ability of certain individuals or groups to participate in the 
political process violate the fundamental precept of equal 
citizenship underlying contemporary visions of democracy. As 
Robert Dahl has explained: “The democratic process is generally 
believed to be justified on the ground that people are entitled to 
participate as political equals in making binding decisions, 
enforced by the state, on matters that have important 
consequences for their individual and collective interests.”26 It is 
such a commitment to formal political equality that provides the 
moral “specification”27 for the conception of democracy that I 
believe underlies the American free speech principle. Whatever 
 
 26. ROBERT A. DAHL, CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DEMOCRACY VERSUS 
GUARDIANSHIP 5 (1985). 
 27. See supra, text accompanying note 8–9. 
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may have been thought in times past, it is now a basic American 
precept that every competent adult member of society has a 
fundamental right to participate in the process by which society’s 
collective decisions are made,28 and as a formal matter at least, 
has a right to do so on an equal basis with all other citizens. 
Indeed, this norm of equal formal participation has become so 
deeply entrenched in our political culture that its violation is 
seen as a denial of the equal moral worth of any individual 
excluded from this process. For this reason, such exclusion for 
public debate is likely to be regarded as deeply insulting. 
Moreover, if some are selectively excluded from voting, or 
even have their voting power diluted by malapportionment,29 or 
are barred from expressing their views on matters of public 
concern—be it the war in Iraq, health care reform, same sex 
marriage, or a proposed tax hike—such a restriction is likely to 
be perceived as fundamentally unfair. And here I want to 
suggest that of the various moral pillars that support the 
legitimacy of a legal system, fundamental fairness is particularly 
crucial. Thus, laws that are, or are perceived to be, 
fundamentally unfair are especially corrosive of the moral 
foundation warranting citizens’ allegiance to the legal system. 
Viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse are, and are 
likely to be perceived by those selectively silenced as, grossly 
unfair. In contrast, fundamental unfairness is not the evil usually 
associated with restrictions on formal autonomy such as laws 
penalizing alienation of affection. 
In the final analysis, then, it is the insult and profound 
unfairness produced by denials of political equality, together 
with their essential connection with the legal system, that render 
viewpoint restrictions on public discourse particularly corrosive 
of political legitimacy. And it is these considerations that make 
such viewpoint discrimination categorically more destructive of 
legitimacy than are infringements of formal autonomy. 
This is not to deny that some restrictions on formal 
autonomy might be illegitimate because they fail, as Ed argues, 
to respect the autonomy that must be attributed to the people 
 
 28. One remaining exception from this modern muscular commitment to political 
equality is the ability of states to constitutionally disenfranchise convicted felons. See 
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  
 29. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (in announcing one 
person, one vote standard the Court explains that “[f]ull and effective participation in 
state government requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the 
election of members of the state legislature”). 
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whom government asks to obey its laws.30 It may even be the 
case that, like viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on public 
discourse, a small subset of these restrictions might tend to 
corrode the legitimacy of the entire legal system.31 Still, in sharp 
contrast to virtually any viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on 
public discourse, many restrictions on the vast array of liberty 
interests encompassed within Ed’s vision of formal autonomy 
are not illegitimate in themselves, and even more certainly do 
not implicate the legitimacy of the legal system. This is true even 
of restrictions on agreement-seeking communicative action, let 
alone all other exercises of formal autonomy. 
A defamation suit by a private person on a matter of private 
concern provides a good example of infringements of formal 
autonomy with no negative implications for political legitimacy. 
Assume that Andy tells Bob that he should shun Charlie, a 
newly-admitted member of their social club, because Charlie 
regularly beats his wife, an accusation that turns out to be false. 
Assume further that Charlie is neither a public official nor a 
public figure, and that although Andy acted negligently in 
making this false accusation, he did not know that the allegation 
was false, nor did he act in reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not. Andy’s condemnation of Charlie fits squarely within 
Ed’s definition of communicative action. Thus contrary to 
current doctrine, which would allow Charlie to recover damages 
from Andy,32 Ed believes that at least in the absence of proof 
 
 30. This might be the case if a law infringed an exercise of formal autonomy based 
upon some relatively weak justification, such as was the case with the ban on homosexual 
sodomy struck down in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Accord Baker, note 1 at 
256. The alienation of affection judgment that I hypothesized in text, an activity that even 
more clearly involves communicative action than does sexual conduct, might, arguably, 
be another example. See note 23, supra. It is telling, however, how difficult it is to come 
up with actual restrictions on communicative action, or even realistic hypothetical ones, 
outside of public discourse that, by my lights at least, would clearly be illegitimate in 
themselves, let alone undermine the political legitimacy of the legal order. 
 31. The ban on homosexual sodomy invalidated in Lawrence might again provide 
an example, at least for the class of people targeted by the law. Interestingly, however, 
such arguable corrosion of the political legitimacy of the legal order likely results as 
much, if not more so, from the discriminatory aspect of that law, which applied to acts of 
homosexual but not heterosexual sodomy. (Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579–86 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the law should be invalidated as violating equal protection 
not due process)). This view is consistent with my suggestion in text that the deeper 
norms underlying political legitimacy are commitments to formal political equality and 
fundamental fairness. Violation of other norms besides formal autonomy and formal 
equality might also undermine the legitimacy the legal system. For example, violation of 
respect for basic human dignity through the routine use of judicial torture would 
obviously compromise the legitimacy of the legal order.  
 32. Assuming that the statement was not deemed a matter of public concern, which 
would be likely, Charlie could recover even in the absence of a showing of fault on 
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that Andy acted in knowing or reckless disregard for the truth, 
allowing Charlie to recover for Andy’s defamatory statements 
would violate the First Amendment because such recovery 
would fail to respect the autonomy of people engaged in 
communicative action.33 
There can, of course, be reasonable disagreement as to what 
level of protection, if any, the First Amendment should provide 
defamatory speech such as Andy’s. But in light of Charlie’s 
important substantive autonomy interests that would likely be 
compromised by the spreading of this false information about 
him, including being shunned, it is difficult to comprehend how 
allowing him to recover damages from Andy is illegitimate in 
itself, let alone diminishes the moral basis that warrants 
allegiance to the legal system. Indeed, it could be more plausibly 
argued that not allowing Charlie to recover damages for Andy’s 
culpable and harmful conduct will tend to corrode the moral 
underpinnings of the legal system. 
So even if Ed is right that “[t]he legitimacy of the legal 
order depends, in part, on it respecting the autonomy that it must 
attribute to the people whom it asks to obey its laws,”34 
government does not fail to respect this autonomy when it has 
good reasons, which will often involve protecting the substantive 
autonomy interests of others, for restricting exercises of formal 
autonomy.35 In contrast, reflecting the essential connection 
between public discourse and political legitimacy, governmental 
interests far more pressing and urgent are needed to justify 
viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on public discussion.36 For 
 
Andy’s part. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–
61 (1985) (plurality opinion); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 
774 (White, J., concurring in judgment). But even in the unlikely event that Andy’s 
statement were found to be on a matter of public concern, Charlie could still recover 
upon showing that Charlie acted negligently. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 346 (1974).  
 33. See Baker, supra note 1 at 282 n.62.  
 34. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).  
 35. The constitutionality of content-neutral regulations on public discourse are 
judged by a not dissimilar standard. See supra note 25. 
 36. Even if not viewpoint based, content-based restrictions on public discourse are 
subject to strict scrutiny. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115–16 (1991). And since “[w]hen the government targets not 
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the 
First Amendment is all the more blatant,” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995), viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions are 
especially anathema to the First Amendment. Indeed, the better view may be that such 
restrictions are never permissible. 
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as Learned Hand recognized nearly a century ago,37 even an 
interest as vital as preventing interference with the war effort is 
not sufficient reason for suppressing anti-war protests in 
democratic societies “dependent upon the free expression of 
opinion as the ultimate source of authority.”38 
3. Other Communicative Acts 
The formal autonomy embraced by Ed’s theory extends not 
just to communicative action by which people seek agreement 
but to many other forms of communication as well. It 
encompasses, for instance, “self-expressive rights that include, 
for example, a right to . . . offend, or condemn,”39 not only as part 
of public discourse or to seeking agreement on matters of private 
concern, but also to face-to-face insults, so-called “fighting 
words.”40 But by including such communication, Ed’s theory not 
only becomes further attenuated from its purported legitimacy 
touchstone but also encounters a logical problem. 
Ed seems to believe that if autonomy is properly 
presupposed for people engaged in seeking agreement through 
communicative action, then this presupposition must carry 
forward the very different types of communicative activity (and 
even to non-communicative exercises of formal autonomy). But 
why should this be? Whether there is a presupposition about a 
particular practice should, it seems to me, depend entirely on the 
nature and function of that practice. Accordingly, as I have 
previously discussed at some length in the related symposium41 
and more briefly above, a basic presupposition of popular 
sovereignty that people are autonomous and rational when 
engaged in democratic self-governance should not automatically 
carry over to people acting in other capacities such as consumers 
 
 37. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d 
Cir. 1917). 
 38. Id. Admittedly, part of the explanation for the virtually absolute prohibition of 
viewpoint-discrimination in public discourse is the warranted skepticism of attempts by 
government to suppress speech critical of it or its policies, skepticism that is usually not 
as justified for restrictions on most liberty interests, including exercises of formal 
autonomy. Still, as Hand suggests, suppression of antiwar speech would not be defensible 
even if it were a moral certainty that widespread public opposition to a war would result 
in increased death of American troops. Id. 
 39. See Baker, supra note 1, at 254. 
 40. See id. at 278, which seems to imply that Ed considers “fighting words” 
protected by his theory. In any event, such expression would seem to be fall squarely 
within the scope of his definition and explication of formal autonomy. See supra, text 
accompanying notes 14–15. 
 41. See Weinstein, supra note 9, at 670–72. 
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of commercial products or as medical patients. Similarly, the fact 
that government must respect the presupposition of autonomy 
inherent in the communicative acts of people seeking agreement 
would not seem relevant to whether government must also 
respect the autonomy of people involved in communicative 
activity not relevant to this practice. 
There may well be reasons, independent of the 
presupposition proper to agreement-seeking communicative 
action, why government must respect the formal autonomy of 
people engaged in communication that is not part of the practice 
of seeking agreement. But in the absence of such an argument, 
Ed’s argument that restrictions on such communication are 
illegitimate would seem to have a hole in it. And consistent with 
this logical lacuna, it is not surprising that concrete examples of 
restriction of speech not part of the practice of seeking 
agreement reveal an even more attenuated connection with 
legitimacy than is the case with restrictions on agreement 
seeking-communication. 
Suppose, for instance, that in an exercise of his formal 
autonomy, a white man walks up to a black man waiting for the 
bus and calls him a “dirty nigger.” It is plausible (though I 
believe mistaken) to maintain, as does Ed, that face-to-face 
insults such as this should be constitutionally protected. But it is 
implausible to maintain that a law preventing someone from 
engaging in such expression undermines the legitimacy of the 
legal system. As with defamation on matters of private concern, 
both the utterer and the target of this expression have moral 
claims sounding in autonomy. For this reason, it is difficult to see 
how prohibiting the speaker from verbally attacking a fellow 
citizen in this way is illegitimate in itself, let alone undercuts the 
moral basis warranting allegiance to our legal system. 
In summary, when we consider the entire gamut of 
communicative acts embraced by Ed’s vision of formal 
autonomy, those part of the practice of seeking agreement as 
well as those outside that practice, the connection with 
legitimacy is remote. Restrictions on some of these 
communicative acts outside of public discourse may arguably 
raise legitimacy concerns in themselves, and a few may possibly 
even threaten the legitimacy of the entire legal system. In 
contrast, virtually any viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on 
public discourse—whether about such monumental issues as 
race relations, the war in Afghanistan, health-care reform, 
abortion or global warming, as well as more mundane issues 
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such as where a new stop light should be placed—denies the 
equal moral status of those so excluded from participation in the 
political process. For this reason, such restrictions are 
particularly likely to corrode the moral foundations warranting 
allegiance to the legal system. So with respect to the task of 
guarding political legitimacy, my dog Demo is better than Ed’s 
dog Auto. 
II. FORMAL AUTONOMY AND DOCTRINAL FIT 
Ed contends that the appeal of a theory of constitutional 
theory should be judged by “the quality of its explanation of 
those aspects of existing doctrine that should be approved and, 
while linking meaningfully to existing constitutional discourse, 
the persuasiveness of its critique of aspects of doctrine that 
should be rejected.”42 Accordingly, although he denies that a 
theory’s overall fit with current doctrine argues in favor of a 
theory, Ed spends considerable effort attempting to show how 
well his autonomy theory explains key areas of doctrine of which 
he approves. But even this attempt to demonstrate limited 
doctrinal fit is unpersuasive and the overall fit between his 
theory and contemporary doctrine is remarkably poor. 
A. ED’S EXPLANATION OF DOCTRINE OF WHICH HE  
APPROVES AS VINDICATING FORMAL AUTONOMY  
1. Compelled Speech 
According to Ed “[t]he poster child” for doctrinal fit with 
formal autonomy is the West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette,43 the World War II era case holding that public 
school children cannot constitutionally be compelled to salute 
the flag.44 There is, it is true, language in that case emphasizing 
such autonomy.45 But despite this language, a commitment to 
formal autonomy with the robustness and breadth that Ed claims 
for it cannot possibly have been at play in that case. For instance, 
it is inconceivable that the Barnette Court (or any Court before 
or since) would have recognized the constitutional right of a 
public school child to refuse to recite a poem that offended the 
 
 42. Baker, supra note 1 at 270. 
 43. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
 44. Baker, supra note 1 at 270–71. 
 45. 319 U.S. at 642 (noting that in compelling the flag salute, government “invades 
the sphere of intellect and spirit”). 
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child’s aesthetic sensibilities. (“I’m sorry Miss O’Grady, but 
being required to recite drivel such as ‘Stopping by Woods’ 
disrespects my autonomy; I would, however, agree to recite one 
of Tennyson’s better works. Otherwise, please speak to my 
lawyer.”) And recent Supreme Court cases confirm that school 
children have no such far-reaching autonomy rights.46 
Ed also attempts to explain in terms of formal autonomy 
Wooley v. Maynard,47 which held that a motorist has a First 
Amendment right to cover up New Hampshire’s state motto 
“Live Free or Die” on his license plate.48 But as confirmed by the 
Court’s repeated reference to the “ideological” or “political” 
content of the compelled expression at issue,49 Wooley cannot 
plausibly be read as recognizing a similar right of a motorist to 
object on aesthetic grounds to the color of the license plate that 
the state requires to be affixed to his automobile, as would 
follow if this decision had vindicated the formal autonomy 
interests that Ed contends underlies the First Amendment. 
2.  The Rule Against Content Discrimination 
Although its scope of operation is often grossly 
exaggerated, the rule against content discrimination is 
nonetheless unquestionably a centerpiece of modern free speech 
doctrine. Therefore, a good test of any theory’s doctrinal fit is its 
ability to explain the purpose and scope of this rule. As do 
Robert and I, Ed seems to recognize that the rule does not 
extend with the same rigor to all settings.50 Ed does not, 
 
 46. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Frazer, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 47. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).  
 48. Baker, supra note 1, at 271 n.30. 
 49. See, e.g., 430 U.S. at 713 (“We are thus faced with the question of whether the 
State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an 
ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the 
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.”); id. at 714 (“A system 
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also 
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.”). 
 50. See Baker, supra note 1, at 280–81. Because Ed’s discussion of the rule against 
content discrimination is limited to speech on government property, my response is also 
limited to those contexts. However, following Robert’s seminal work on the subject (e.g., 
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 
200–01 (1995)), I have elsewhere attempted to show more generally that this rule exists 
primarily within contexts dedicated to democratic self-governance. See, e.g., JAMES 
WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE 
SPEECH DOCTRINE 40–43 (1999). This larger point is neatly made in the related 
symposium by Robert’s contrasting the First Amendment protection afforded a dentist 
who publicly disagrees the American Dental Association’s policy against dentists 
advising their patients to have their mercury amalgam filings replaced, with the lack of 
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however, attempt, as we do, to explain the Court’s fierce but 
limited antipathy to content discrimination by positing that the 
rule operates primarily within settings dedicated to democratic 
self-governance, such as in a traditional public forum, but not in 
settings dedicated to other purposes, such as courtroom or 
government workplace.51 Rather, Ed attempts to explain the 
wavering pattern of protection by arguing that respect for formal 
autonomy requires government to allow speech on public 
property and “institutionally bound” speech unless it is 
“basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular 
place at a particular time,”52 citing the Court’s 1972 opinion in 
Grayned v. City of Rockford.53 The problem with Ed’s 
explanation, as a descriptive matter at least, is that time and 
doctrine have passed it by. 
In the early 1970s the Court did, as recited in Grayned, 
fleetingly embrace an “incompatibility” standard. Just a couple 
of years later, however, the Court was already backing away 
from this standard,54 and by 1983 it had completely changed 
course, adopting instead a rigid, categorical approach in Perry 
Educ. Assoc. v Perry Local Educators’ Assn.55 Perry’s tripartite 
division of public property includes the speech-limiting concept 
of the “non-public forum,”56 settings in which government has 
extensive authority to regulate both access to the forum and the 
content of speech in ways patently inconsistent with the flexible 
“incompatibility” standard described in Grayned.57 
The same term that it decided Perry, the Court also handed 
down Connick v. Myers,58 which held, with one important 
 
protection for the same dentist who advises her patient to have such filings replaced. See 
Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 481-82 
(2011). 
 51. Also, as I discuss in note 24, above, the rule against content discrimination is 
best understood as strategic overprotection against viewpoint discrimination. 
 52. Baker, supra note 1, at 280. 
 53. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Though Grayned dealt with a content-neutral ban on access 
to public property (upholding an anti-noise ordinance applicable to property adjacent to 
schools), it is fair enough that Ed uses that decision’s incompatibility approach for 
measuring the validity of all restrictions for speech on public property, including content-
based restrictions in the workplace and other “institutionally-bound” contexts. 
 54. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
 55. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).  
 56. Recently, and confusingly, referred to in Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 
S. Ct. 2971, 2985 n.11 (2010), as a “limited public forum.” 
 57. Perry’s reservation of the rule against content-discrimination to traditional and 
designated public forums is, in contrast, easily explained by a theory based in 
participatory democracy.  
 58. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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exception, that the First Amendment places virtually no limits 
on the authority of managers to discipline public employees for 
the content of their workplace speech. The exception is for 
speech is on a “matter of public concern,” expression eligible for 
First Amendment protection.59 The nearly complete authority 
that the Court gives workplace managers to regulate speech not 
of public concern specifically belies specifically an 
“incompatibility” standard for “institutionally-bound” speech. 
More generally, such managerial authority over the content of 
workplace speech is inconsistent with the view that the First 
Amendment mandates respect for the formal autonomy of 
government employees. In contrast, the availability of protection 
for speech on matters of public concern, but not for other 
workplace expression, fits snuggly with the view that 
participatory democracy is the First Amendment’s primary 
concern.60 
B. THE POOR OVERALL FIT BETWEEN FORMAL AUTONOMY 
AND CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Ed readily admits there are several important areas of the 
law that contradict the view that free speech doctrine is based on 
respect for formal autonomy. He writes, for instance, that 
defamation law is “possibly the area where case law most 
obviously contradicts” such a theory.61 Other areas that 
contradict his theory include “fighting words,”62 copyright63 
obscenity and commercial speech.64 
With regard to obscenity, Ed is surely right that “[f]rom an 
autonomy perspective, the issue is easy,” for “the right to 
exercise ‘autonomous control over the development and 
expression of one’s intellect, tastes, and personality’” would 
plainly seem to embrace the right to produce, distribute, and 
consume obscene material.65 But as Ed also correctly observes, 
“existing doctrine denies protection to obscenity.” In contrast, as 
 
 59. Id. at 146 . 
 60. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 493–97. 
 61. Baker, supra note 1, at 282. 
 62. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 63. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
891, 951 (2002) (arguing contrary to First amendment doctrine that “copyright generally 
cannot be applied to limit noncommercial copying” consistent with the individual auton-
omy interests he believes the First Amendment protects). 
 64. Baker, supra note 1, at 272–74. 
 65. Baker, supra note 1, at 276.  
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I have discussed at length elsewhere,66 and as Ed agrees,67 the 
exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection does 
not contradict a theory rooted in participatory democracy.68 With 
respect to commercial speech, Ed argues that under his view of 
formal autonomy there are multiple reasons “to deny protection 
to commercial speech.”69 But contradicting any claim of doctrinal 
fit with Ed’s theory, the Court has extended increasingly 
rigorous protection to commercial advertising.70 A theory based 
in participatory democracy, in contrast, at least offers a plausible 
justification for this result.71 
The strong protection that current doctrine provides 
abstract art and symphonic music, as well as private speech not 
related to public issues, are areas where formal autonomy’s fit 
with current doctrine is superior to democratic theory’s doctrinal 
fit.72 But in light of all the other crucial areas of free speech 
 
 66. James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 865 (2007) [hereinafter Weinstein, Democracy, Sex]; James Weinstein, 
Free Speech Values, Hardcore Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to 
Professor Koppelman, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 911 (2008) [hereinafter 
Weinstein, Reply to Koppelman].  
 67. See Baker, supra note 1, at 277 (explaining that the denial of protection coheres 
with “most political speech theories” including ones based in “participation in public 
discourse”). 
 68. For an interesting argument that obscenity doctrine does interfere with 
democratic participation, see Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and 
Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 544–46 (1979). For a response to this 
argument, see Weinstein, Democracy, Sex, supra note 66, at 888–92. 
 69. Baker, supra note 1, at 272 (emphasis added). 
 70. See, e.g., 44 Liqormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 71. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 1. (2000). I, however, continue to think that promotion of the audience’s substan-
tive autonomy interest provides a more forthright explanation for the protection of 
commercial advertising. See James Weinstein, Fools, Knaves, and the Protection of 
Commercial Speech: A Response to Professor Redish, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 150–52 
(2007). 
 72. As I discuss in the related symposium, with respect to the few areas where 
participatory democracy cannot easily explain current doctrine, the problem is one of 
incompleteness rather than inconsistency or contradiction. See Weinstein, supra note 2, 
at 500. Unlike the massive contradiction that would attend any attempt to explain current 
doctrine in terms of autonomy, formal or substantive, incompleteness does not 
undermine doctrinal coherence. Rather, the failure of participatory democracy to explain 
all of free speech doctrine can be explained by recognizing the undeniable fact that as a 
descriptive matter several values inform American free speech doctrine. See id. at 497–
504. Admittedly, the existence of highly protected speech such as abstract art or 
symphonic music is in tension with my descriptive claim that participatory democracy is 
the only core free speech norm. My proposed solution for solidifying participatory 
democracy as the sole core free speech norm is to protect exercises of formal autonomy 
such as the creation of abstract art and symphonic music as well as intimate conversation 
not related to matters of public concern as fundamental liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause, in accordance with the protection already provided kindred autonomy 
interests under that provision. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 499 n.45; Weinstein, Reply 
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doctrine that have a poor fit with formal autonomy, including 
the key areas discussed in Section A of this Part, the overall fit 
between doctrine and formal autonomy is relatively poor, 
especially as compared to the good fit between these crucial 
areas and a theory grounded in participatory democracy.  
In the related symposium, Ed made the astute observation 
that we do not have an agreed upon metric to measure overall 
fit.73 The absence of such a metric would indeed be a problem if 
there were not such an obvious disparity between the fit of the 
two theories we are comparing. Thus we might need a scale to 
determine (and here I am afraid I am dating myself) whether 
Orson Wells or Jackie Gleason was heavier; but we need no such 
“metric” to confidently conclude that Gleason weighed more 
than Willie Shoemaker. By the same token, if I am correct that 
in such key areas as defamation, copyright, compelled speech, 
obscenity, commercial speech and the scope and operation of the 
rule against content discrimination, there is poor fit between 
doctrine and formal autonomy; and if there is a much better fit 
in most of these area with participatory democracy; then there is 
no need for a sophisticated metric to conclude that a theory 
grounded in participatory democracy fits doctrine better than 
does a theory based on formal autonomy. 
III. WHY FIT MATTERS 
The demonstration that a theory grounded in participatory 
democracy has a better overall fit with current doctrine than 
does a theory based in formal autonomy raises the question of 
why fit matters in judging the merits of a free speech theory.74 
This question is particularly pertinent here since Ed denies that 
overall fit is relevant to such a determination. The answer to this 
question depends crucially on what a theory of free speech 
doctrine is meant to accomplish. If one is especially interested—
as I am—in bringing coherence to what otherwise might appear 
to be largely a jumbled assortment of cases,75 the importance of a 
 
to Koppelman, supra note 66, at 915 n.22. Ed charges that this move is “reminiscent” of 
Alexander Meikeljohn’s extending the scope of his democracy-based theory to give it 
better doctrinal fit, but which simultaneously diminished his theory’s “bite.” See Baker, 
supra note 1, at 271 n.32. I do not believe the comparison is apt. Assigning the protection 
of certain activity to another constitutional provision to which it more properly belongs 
rather than to the First Amendment is quite unlike Meikeljohn’s expanding the scope of 
the protection provided by his First Amendment principle to improve its doctrinal fit.  
 73. See C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis?, 97 VA. L. REV. 515 (2011). 
 74. See Baker, supra note 1, at 270. 
 75. As Robert has aptly observed, “first amendment doctrine is neither clear nor 
!!WEINSTEIN-272-RESPONSETOBAKER3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:26 AM 
2011] WEINSTEIN RESPONSE TO BAKER 381 
 
theory with good doctrinal fit is manifest. Such coherence will 
increase doctrine’s clarity, stability, and administrability, benefits 
that are particularly desirable in this area of the law.76 Of course, 
any attempt to understand and organize case law requires 
interpretation and judgment, and thus cannot be a purely 
descriptive, value free exercise. Indeed, the pragmatic benefits 
just described, as well as my attempt to organize free speech 
doctrine around a single core principle so as to decrease judges’ 
ability to smuggle their ideological predilections into the 
application of doctrine, are, at bottom, normative concerns.77 
Still, determining which principle best fits the pattern of the 
decisions can and should be a primarily descriptive exercise. 
This largely descriptive process of determining which theory 
best fits contemporary doctrine is, however, only the first step in 
deciding whether it is the best overall free speech theory. Overt 
normative critique also has a crucial role to play in this process. 
In interpreting an open-textured provision such as the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, a morally repugnant 
theory, or even a merely unappealing one, should be rejected no 
matter how good the doctrinal fit.78 Similarly, if two theories fit 
doctrine approximately equally as well, the more normatively 
appealing one should be judged the best theory. Indeed, if one 
theory is demonstrably more appealing than all others, than it 
should be acclaimed the best theory even if it does not have as 
good doctrinal fit as contending but less appealing theories. If 
there is common ground for judging the normative appeal of two 
competing theories, then it might be possible to determine which 
theory is the more normatively appealing. But if two theories are 
both appealing, though in different, incommensurate ways, it 
would, as I suggested at the beginning of this response, most 
likely be bootless to argue that one theory is more appealing 
 
logical. It is a vast Sargasso Sea of drifting and entangled values, theories, rules, 
exceptions, predilections.” Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First 
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 278 (1991). 
 76. For a discussion of other advantages of good doctrinal fit, see Weinstein, supra 
note 9, at 634–35.  
 77. One might also add that the largely unconscious exclusion of the host of 
logically possible but morally or culturally unacceptable explanations of the data is also a 
deeply normative process. 
 78. Thus although I do believe that doctrinal fit should have a significant role to 
play in determining the best theory in various areas of constitutional law, this does not 
require, as Ed seems to suggest, that one to be “an apologist for the status quo” or to 
explain the “legal correctness” of morally repugnant cases. Baker, supra note 1, at 270. 
See, for example, my explanation in the related symposium of why Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), was wrongly decided. Weinstein, supra note 2, at 501 n.53, 
504 n. 64, 510 n.85. 
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than the other. In such a case, if doctrinal coherence and the 
pragmatic benefits it brings are to be given any significant 
weight, then among normatively appealing theories, the one with 
the best doctrinal fit should be acclaimed the best overall theory 
of free speech. 
Ed agrees with Robert and me that the touchstone for 
determining the normative appeal of a basic free speech 
principle is how well it promotes political legitimacy. If, as I 
attempted to show in Part I of this response, democratic 
participation is more robustly connected with the promotion of 
legitimacy than is formal autonomy, then as between these two 
theories, one based in democratic participation is the better 
theory of free speech, further enhanced by its superior doctrinal 
fit. Ed might argue, however, that since his theory encompasses 
participatory democracy and all the legitimacy it bestows, while 
my theory excludes exercises of formal autonomy not related to 
democratic participation and whatever contribution to 
legitimacy it has to offer, then even on the assumption that 
participatory democracy has a closer tie to legitimacy than does 
formal autonomy, his more inclusive theory is necessarily more 
appealing. In light of such demonstrable normative superiority, 
the argument might continue, a theory based in formal 
autonomy is the better free speech theory even if participatory 
democracy can claim better overall doctrinal fit. 
Significantly, however, my theory does not preclude 
constitutional protection of formal autonomy; it merely denies 
that this norm is, or should be, a core free speech principle. 
Though I think it would be preferable if all exercises of formal 
autonomy, including expressive ones, were dealt with exclusively 
as liberty interests under the Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence,79 I have no strong objection to the Court 
extending First Amendment protection in appropriate cases to 
expressive exercises of formal autonomy. However, because, as I 
explained in Part I, restrictions on the wide range of expressive 
activities embraced with Ed’s vision of formal autonomy will not 
usually jeopardize the legitimacy of the legal system, I do 
strongly disagree with his view that all expressive exercises of 
such autonomy warrants “virtually absolute” First Amendment 
protection.80 Accordingly, if political legitimacy is to be the 
 
 79. See supra note 72. 
 80. Baker, supra note 1, at 252. Which is not to deny that, in some respects, such a 
broadly encompassing theory may have advantages over one more narrowly based in 
democratic participation. For example, Ed’s autonomy principle might, even in its core 
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primary criterion for judging the merits of a free speech theory, 
one having a direct and robust connection with such legitimacy is 
to be preferred to a contending theory that would extend 
rigorous protection to a great deal of expression having little or 
no connection to that norm.81 
But let’s assume for the sake of argument that the neither 
theory is demonstrably more appealing than the other, but, 
rather, that the most that can be established in a discussion 
among informed observers such as this is that formal autonomy 
and participatory democracy each, though in different ways, 
supply very appealing bases for a theory of free speech. In that 
event, if the interest in creating coherent, workable free speech 
doctrine is to be given any significant weight, the question of 
which principle has the superior overall doctrinal fit then 
becomes determinative. 
 
application, protect important liberty interests that would otherwise fall between the 
cracks of my participatory democracy principle and the Court’s current substantive due 
process jurisprudence. But this possible benefit is, in my view, more than offset by the 
risk that massively extending the First Amendment to protect activity having little or no 
connection to political legitimacy will dilute the protection available to activity such as 
core political speech having a vital connection with the legitimacy of the legal system. For 
a more detailed discussion of this dilution problem, see James Weinstein, Seana Shiffrin’s 
Thinker-Based Theory of Free Speech: Elegant and Insightful, But Will it Work in 
Practice?, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 393–95 (2011). See also Weinstein, supra note 71, at 
156–58. 
 81. Though its more vital connection to the promotion of legitimacy is primarily 
what makes a theory based in democratic participation more appealing than one based in 
formal autonomy, there is another advantage of political participation worth mentioning. 
As Ed concedes, his vision of formal autonomy is “wildly contested” as a moral theory, 
let alone a basis of free speech doctrine. Baker, supra note 1, at 269. In contrast, that 
each citizen in this country has an equal right to participate in the democratic process, 
including the right to voice her views on matters of public concern, is a proposition that, 
to borrow Frank Michelman’s remark about democratic self-governance in general, “no 
earnest, non-disruptive participant in American constitutional debate is quite free to 
reject.” Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1526–27 (1988). All things 
being equal (and then some), basing free speech doctrine on a principle that attracts 
near-universal acceptance from both legal actors and the American public will tend to 
produce clearer, more certain and more stable doctrine in an area of the law in which 
such attributes are particularly desirable than would basing doctrine on a wildly 
contested principle. Ed writes that “the laws Congress (and individual states) pass 
limiting political . . . speech” suggest that consensus that I claim about democratic 
participation is “not so clear.” Baker, supra note 1, at 269. I am not sure what laws Ed 
has in mind, for attempts to pass blatant viewpoint restrictions on public discourse are 
nowadays rare, even at the state and local level. In any event, that politicians do not 
always act in accordance with what they know to be a core democratic precept is neither 
surprising nor disproof that there is in fact a clear consensus about that precept. Also, 
that there is wide-spread consensus about a norm does not assure that there will always 
be consensus either about its interpretation or application. Still, a principle reflecting a 
widely-shared national commitment will be interpreted and applied with more clarity and 
certainty that one based on a “wildly contested” norm.    
